

**Producing Urbanity: The *Tactics* of the Tanzanian
Daladala Worker**

Candidate Number: 88196

Word Count: 10 824

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to express my appreciation to all those who anonymously participated in this research and consented to being interviewed. Mamertus Kifaru provided invaluable as both translator and assistant throughout this research, and the help of Viane Nyoni made my research in Dar es Salaam much easier. And finally, John Moonen's curmudgeonly hut in Songea afforded me the ideal retreat in which to organize my data.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

	Page
Acknowledgements	1
Part 1: Introduction	3
Part 2: Elusive Urbanity	4
Part 3: Realigning the Lefebvrian Trialectic	8
Part 4: Producing Space	10
Part 5: The Tanzanian Context	13
5.1 Dar es Salaam & Tanga	14
5.2 Economic Profile	15
Part 6: Daladalas in Tanzania	17
Part 7: Representations of Space & Representational Space in Urban Roadways	19
7.1 Constituting Masculinity	20
7.2 Contesting the Roadways	26
Part 8: Discussion	30
Part 9: Conclusions	33
References	35
Appendix 1: Methodology	40
Appendix 2: Map of Tanzania	44
Appendix 3: Images of Daladalas	45

1. Introduction

The spatial practices of contemporary cities are only legible if they conform to the discourse through which they are read. Academics have promulgated various ‘complete’ theorizations of the city in recent decades, yet each bears the certain risk that it potentially dismisses the relevance of those cities whose distinct nature obviates their easy inclusion into the discourse’s paradigmatic representation of urbanity. This problem of reading cities with the wrong language is particularly acute for the large cities in the developing world, which grow with little regard for how well they conform to accepted ideas of urbanity.

Academics explicate the in-transferability of theories developed on the empirics of ‘Northern cities’ to ‘Southern’ cities through two predominant techniques. They can assume the theological premise that ‘Southern’ cities only require time before they develop into recognizable facsimiles of their ‘Northern’ counterparts; or they can decrease the resolution of their idea of urbanity, as the ‘ordinary city’ proponents do, until more diverse manifestations of the contemporary city are encompassed by its language. While each attempt explicates certain aspects of the city, neither satisfies a comprehensive vision of the contemporary city.

The Lefebvrian spatial trialectic provides a useful conceptual tool for elucidating how local actors constitute the space of their city in tandem with their historical legacies and the globalizing of both capitalism and dominant epistemologies. The tension among the three forces – representations of space, spatial practice and representational space – shifts according to various factors and accounts for the multiple kinds of urbanity extant today (Lefebvre 1991). When spatial practice coheres with our hegemonic representations of space, the fabric of the city is legible; when, on the other hand, the everyday practices of representational space dominate spatial practice, our representations of space will prove inadequate in understanding the city. ‘Northern’ cities are familiar to us because the spatial practices therein, the dominant uses of the space, closely follow our representations of space – our historical understandings of urbanity as well as the dictates of planners. Not all cities adhere to this conception,

however, as Rem Koolhaas – perhaps the most evocative portraitist of representational spaces through his work on Lagos, Nigeria – notes (Koolhaas 2000, 2002). Because Lagos’ illegibility is comparable to that of Tanzanian cities, Koolhaas’ work will serve as documentary support throughout this paper.

To elaborate this idea, this paper examines the representational spaces of the urban roadways in Tanzania. Data gathered during fieldwork indicates that the spatial *tactics*, which the cities’ bus drivers use to constitute their masculinity, is responsible for much of the representational space of the roadways (de Certeau 1984). The daladala workers, as they are known, use their work as an alternative means to express their masculinity since widespread unemployment has hindered their ability to fulfil their patriarchal role as head of household. The spatial manifestations of the *tactics*, which the daladala workers employ, create the representational space of the roadways, and tracing these manifestations back to explainable motivations makes the city readable.

Examining the space of the urban roadways allows for testing the assumption that ‘Southern’ cities would lose some of their ‘chaos’ if their representational spaces were sufficiently understood, rather than being disregarded as mere deviations from the hegemonic discourses of urbanity. This paper attempts this test, but must first address the gap in urban theory, which the Lefebvrian trialectic begins to redress by allowing for a multiplicity of urban forms in the spirit of Calvino’s Venice.

2. Elusive Urbanity

“The fundamental conundrum of Lagos, considered as both paradigm and pathological extreme of the West African city, is its continued existence and productivity in spite of a near-complete absence of those infrastructures, systems, organizations, and amenities that define the word “city” in terms of Western planning methodology. Lagos as an icon of West African urbanity, inverts every essential characteristic of the so-called modern city. Yet, it is still – for lack of a better word – a city; and one that works.”
(Koolhaas 2000: 652)

Koolhaas' consternation in first experiencing the seemingly undecipherable, yet unquestionable urbanity of the teeming conurbation of Lagos is a tacit admission that the conceptualizations of cities, which predominate among Western academics and planners fail to encompass the myriad diversities of the urban experience. Global or world city theorists as well as the postmodernist structuralists of the LA School dominate much of contemporary discourse about Northern cities. Rooted in the work of academics such as Saskia Sassen (1991) and John Friedman (1995); and Edward Soja (1989; 2000) and Alan Scott (1999) respectively, these two schools have played important roles in making cities central to our understanding of the world, and in explaining the ways in which globalizing forces and post-fordist capitalism have shaped cities. Alternatively, cities in the developing world are often viewed through the lens of developmentalism, which positions these cities as existing at the beginning of a developmental path of economic growth or assistance that will ultimately lead to convergence with Northern cities (Robinson 2002). Nevertheless, there have been numerous critiques of these theories, and although these have already been well documented elsewhere, (Amin & Thrift 1997; Murray 2004; Robinson 2002, 2004; Simon 1995), it is necessary to draw attention to some of the specific points of criticism so that alternative theoretical conceptualizations can be examined in context.

Both schools over specify the attributes that constitute a city and rely on an economistic definition of city-hood. The global cities school does this through creating a teleological, categorization of ranks through which cities aspire to ascend by competing for command of global flows (Robinson2002). "By privileging the functional specialisations of large metropolitan regions within the world economy, the 'global cities' approach restricts the kinds of questions that can be legitimately addressed within its conceptual frame of reference" (Murray 2004: 1). Focusing on how the finance, real estate, and information technology sectors interact to create cities obviates alternative paths of enquiry about the nature of cities,

while also asserting that the spatiality of cities is dependent on how infrastructure is organized to capture these global ‘flows’.

Similarly, the LA school’s generalizations about edge cities, multiple nodes, ‘post-industrialization’ and fractured metropolises are astounding for their scope and for their reliance on the empirics from one particular conurbation in one particular stage of capitalist development for extrapolation to other postmodern cities. (Amin & Thrift 1997). The possibility exists that LA may not be a paradigm of every future city, let alone most cities.

The LA school’s assumption that cities will converge towards a certain morphology due to postfordist, capitalist processes as well as the global cities theorists’ focus on commanding ‘flows’ both imply definite goals towards which the third world cities conceived of by the developmentalists can strive if only they achieve the right balance of economic growth, intelligent planning, and good governance (Robinson 2002). These heuristics of cities are dangerous not only because they exclude cities which do not adhere to them, but also because “policy makers need to be offered alternative ways of imagining cities, their differences and their possible futures – neither seeking global status nor simply reducing the problem of improving city life to the promotion of ‘development’ [until they do reach global city status]” (Robinson 2002; 545).

Robinson (2002), and Murray (2004) seek to redress the tendency of contemporary urban theorists to leave so many cities in the developing world off of the discursive map, by describing what Amin & Thrift term the ‘ordinary city’ (Amin & Thrift 1997), a less specified way of understanding “the urban as the co-presence of multiple spaces, multiple times and multiple webs or relations, tying local sites, subjects and fragments into globalizing networks of economic, social, and cultural change” (Amin & Thrift 1997: 417-418). Whereas the global cities and LA schools come to their understandings of cities through looking at how specific processes constitute the whole, those who embrace the ‘ordinary city’ examine the city with such a low resolution that urbanity is loosely conceived of as a density of processes.

While such a broad conceptualization of cities brings places such as Lagos back onto the discursive map, the concept of the ‘ordinary city’ can only be seen as a template or meta-theory onto which other theorizations can be fitted (Robinson 2002). Although “there is a very real danger that cultural arrogance may obscure the fact that African countries’ engagements with globalising processes may well be very different from those experienced in advanced capitalist countries,” these forces can not be ignored as capitalism, historically through colonialism, and contemporarily through supranational institutions has certainly affected cities in the developing world (Briggs & Mwamfupe 1999: 798). The impact of colonialism on the spatial form of cities in the developing world has been dramatic, as has the more recent influence of supranational institutions such as the World Bank (WB) and International Monetary Fund (IMF) (King 1990; Sassen 1998); and their influence must be taken into account as part of the constellation of factors – among which must be included social, cultural, and historical legacies – that influence the spatiality of these cities (Shatkin 1998 in Robinson 2002).

Postcolonial theorists such as Gillian Hart (2002) broach this necessary consideration by insisting that the “multiplicity of historical geographies... [are] not simply the *effects* of global flows and processes, but... [are] *constitutive* of them” (Hart 2002: 14, original emphasis). They rightfully insist that local and global processes constitute each other and create the urban experience, but they are particularists in that each case must be examined individually and they do not offer spatial conceptualizations of the city.

Henri Lefebvre’s notion of socially produced space addresses some of these concerns through the spatial trialectic by incorporating these divergent influences into any analysis of urban space. His triad of spatial practice, representations of space, and representational spaces explicitly includes discourse driven practice, extra-discursive practice, as well as discourse itself, as factors that contribute to the production of urban space. (Lefebvre 1991) Not only does the nature of each constituent force contribute to a particular manifestation of urbanity,

but also does the way in which the tension among the three is manifested. This point is key in explaining how “different societies and cultural groups respond [in disparate ways] to the same politico-economic imperatives... and how these are reflected in the form and fabric of the respective cities” (Simon 1995: 78).

The following section examines the production of space in greater detail, but as a rough heuristic – in those cities that cohere with our predominant discourses, spatial practice dominates representational space, whereas in cities, such as Lagos, which seem illegible, representational space dominates spatial practice. To understand these latter cities, representational spaces must be examined in the context of social, cultural, historical, and globalizing conditions; i.e. a discourse for the representational space must be described. Once this understanding is achieved, the urban space can be read without the bias, which our own representations of space create in our worldview.

3. Realigning the Lefebvrian Trialectic

Tim Unwin cautions that “Lefebvre’s arguments are constructed in such a way that they are not readily summarized; his project is designed to elicit debate and engagement” (Unwin 2000: 13). Indeed, David Harvey and Ed Soja, two of Lefebvre’s most visible intellectual heirs, diverge on their interpretation of his ideas. The uncertainty and complexity of Lefebvre’s ideas make them rich ground for the Deleuzian notion of approaching “theory not as something to genuflect before, but as a tool kit from which to draw selectively in light of the analytical task at hand” (Haggerty & Ericson 2000: 608; Brenner & Elden 2001).

While this paper will maintain the tone of each of the constituent parts of the trialectic:

1. *Spatial practice*: [under neocapitalism] embodies a close association, within perceived space, between daily reality (daily routine) and urban reality (the routes and networks which link up the places set aside for work, ‘private’ life and leisure);
2. *Representations of space*: conceptualized space, the space of scientists, planners, urbanists, technocratic subdividers and social engineers, as of a certain type of artists with a scientific bent – all

- of whom identify what is lived and what is perceived with what is conceived; and
3. *Representational spaces*: space as directly *lived* through its associated images and symbols, and hence the space of ‘inhabitants’ and ‘users’... this is the dominated – and hence passively experienced space, which the imagination seeks to change and appropriate, (Lefebvre 1991: 38-39)

the trialectic will be problematized beyond what customarily interests Lefebvrian theorists such as Harvey and Soja. Lefebvre and most who write about him, assume a coherence between spatial practice and representations of space, and see in representational spaces the possibility for revolution. It is on the basis of their representational space “that those social movements, which oppose capitalism and certain aspects of the bureaucratic state, rise up and draw their strength (Burkitt 2004: 224). Since space is a product of the mode of production or social formation, the creation of new space would indicate that a new social form has taken hold (Lefebvre 1991: Unwin 2000: Purcell 2002). For Lefebvre, his trialectic is both a way of describing the complexities of space as well as asserting that space is “the ultimate locus and medium of struggle, and is therefore a crucial political issue” (Elden 2004: 93).

While most examine Lefebvre through the aforementioned assumption about the coherence of the trialectic and attribute to representational spaces only a potentiality, Lefebvre acknowledges that this coherence only exists in “favourable circumstances, when a common language, a consensus and a code can be established” (Lefebvre 1991: 40). What happens when the coherence falters and both spatial practice and representations of space are subsumed under representational spaces?

This paper will demonstrate that in cities where this is the case, those who maintain the discourse of the hegemonic representations of space will be unable to articulate an understanding of those cities’ urbanity, and instead situate their urbanity as a chaos requiring ordering according to accepted standards. Thus, Rem Koolhaas, originally a student of the ‘Northern’ city, would find Lagos alien until he understood how the representational or lived spaces of the city function. After abandoning his preconceptions as a European architect, he

realized that the massive traffic jams in downtown Lagos, an urban planner's nightmare are not signs of utter system failure, but "jam-space, the totally negotiable, usually illegal and hugely productive space of the traffic jam... not something to fix, solve," or despise, because the jam-space served more people than the road would have if used only as a space for the efficient flow of fast moving traffic (Koolhaas 2000: 685). "The engrained vocabulary and values of architectural discourse are painfully inadequate to describe the current production of urban substance," because the production of urban substance is being created by those forces which arise from the representational spaces rather than those attendant to the discourse of representations of space. (Koolhaas 2002: 175).

The representational space, which is a product of daily practice, is not only the potential locus of change, but also an integral trialectical component in the production of space. Depending on the specific way in which the tension among the parts in the trialectic configures, the representational space may inherently affect the production of space as much as or more than the representations of space. This paper asserts that the chance of this is especially high when the representations of space are imported extra-culturally and from external epistemologies.

4. Producing Space

The relationship among the parts of the trialectic is not static, but rather, the tensions change through time as various factors contest to influence the production of space. Even as neoliberal capitalism becomes hegemonic, the space that it produces in its image "cannot [be a space] with a perfectly clear understanding of cause and effect, motive and implication," because it abuts against ingrained histories and cultural factors (Lefebvre 1991: 37).

"Mediations and mediators, have to be taken into consideration: the action of groups, factors within knowledge, within ideology, or within the domain of representations" (Ibid: 77).

Capitalism will not reproduce a uniform space globally as it solidifies its hegemony because

capitalism is not static and the mediating institutions through which it spreads differ across regions and through time.

Various institutions have mediated capitalism in Africa, with the colonial governments representing an early force and supranational institutions and technocratic planning being contemporary manifestations (King 1990). Colonial cities were the “‘nerve centre’ of colonial exploitation. Concentrated there were the institutions through which capitalism extended its control over the colonial economy” (McGee 1967: 56-7 in King 1990). Although the formation of these cities is not unproblematic, the mediator of hegemony was introduced, and cities were planned according to the dictates of the science of planning and in keeping with Northern traditions of city building. These spaces of colonial planning remain in the fabric of cities throughout the developing world.

As colonial cities developed to accommodate the economic needs of the business empire, tensions arose about the use of urban space. While the cities and economic enterprises such as shipping required the labour of the native Africans, the administrators were uneasy with the how the natives created their space of reproduction in illegal shantytowns. “The problem with illegal space in an African city was not that it failed to reproduce a work force quite cheaply, but that it reproduced the wrong work force. Squatter settlements and self-built houses eased the housing crisis, but they gave rise to the wrong kind of city:” one which did not adhere to the hegemonic conception of urbanity that the planners and colonialists carried with them from Europe (Cooper 1983: 32). The colonial city served “as a political means of introducing a social and economic structure in such a way that it may gain a foothold and indeed establish its ‘base’ in a particular locality... producing space by political power – that is by violence in the service of economic goals” (Lefebvre 1991: 151-152). This introduction bore not only the implication of penetrating the African economy with the capitalist mode of production, but also created the physical spaces of the colonial city

itself, and the social and physical spaces had the legacy of encouraging certain uses of space while prohibiting others (Ibid).

Contemporary African cities have inherited not only the spaces of colonialism, but also the discourse as many of the officials are educated in Northern universities, so that the governments and regulatory agencies may “assimilate the very things which yesterday were instrumental in their servitude: science, technology, and all the ideas and ideologies which they drag along in their wake, although they have been superseded as such: rationalism, positivism, scientism. [But] these ideas and ideologies are frequently incompatible with the cultures, traditions and identity of nations and peoples who are forced to adopt them,” and ignore the possible diversities of spaces (Lefebvre 1995: 196; Lefebvre 1991).

The contestation of what constitutes acceptable urban space – in an echo of the original colonial tensions – continues today in African cities as governments raze squatter settlements constructed of local materials because they do not meet certain regulations and when the WB and IMF encourage the development of Northern style housing in projects that they support (Huchzermeyer 2001).

This paper focuses on spaces where this contestation occurs, what Lefebvre terms ‘dominated spaces,’ those spaces that are “transformed – and mediated – by technology, by practice, [such as] a slab of concrete or a motorway... In order to dominate space, technology introduces a new form into a pre-existing space” (Lefebvre 1991: 164-165). Lefebvre sees these spaces as sterile and closed, yet they are spaces of contestation, for they are actively appropriated to “in order to serve the needs and possibilities of a group” (Ibid: 165).

Subsequent sections explore these ideas vis-à-vis an examination of Tanzania’s urban roadways, the chaos and seeming dysfunction of which have prompted numerous reports from the academics, the WB, and other planning agencies (Olvera et al. 2003; Benmaamar 2003; Howe & Bryceson 2000; TRL 2002). The urban roadways of Tanzanian cities are evocative of the dissonance that must occur when we seek to understand practices through a discourse

with which they do not cohere, and most of these studies focus, anyway, on consumption rather than production, seeking to improve the safety, efficiency, and accessibility for passengers, rather than suggesting realistic solutions that will facilitate viable livelihoods for the workers themselves.

The daladala workers represent the largest user group in most cities and studying the ways that they constitute these ‘sterile’ spaces illustrates that the appropriation of space by daladalas actually dominates the hegemonic notion of how roadways should function. Using de Certeau’s conception of *tactics*, this paper examines how daladala drivers “use, manipulate, and divert these spaces,” to create their representational space (de Certeau 1984: 30). For while the daladala workers do not physically alter the space of the roadways, their *tactics* interfere and interact with spatial practice and the representations of space to create the space of the roadways (Lefebvre 1991). *Tactics* are not less important than *strategies*, which involve the production and imposition of space – a project, for example, that is effected by those who build shanty-towns, as well as by urban planners – for *tactics* can still challenge the abstract representations of space promulgated by the strategists. (de Certeau 1984: Hubbard & Sanders 2003).

By acknowledging that these *tactics* and, “spatial practices [of appropriation] take on specific meanings and these meanings are put into motion and spaces used in a particular way through the agency of class, gender, or other social practices” this paper will explore the daladala workers’ reclamation of masculinity as a driving force behind their appropriation of space (Harvey 1987: 269).

5. The Tanzanian Context

Research for this project was conducted over three weeks in July 2005 and consisted mostly of observation as well as 30 ‘guided conversation’ interviews, with daladala drivers,

conductors¹, and owners primarily in Dar es Salaam (Dar) and Tanga city in Tanzania. The interviews were conducted near the bus stands while the daladalas waited for passengers and focused on the workers' experiences, motivations for driving, relationships with government and other stake holders, as well as how the workers identified their roles, and provide the sources for the anonymous quotes used in this paper. The observation entailed riding along various routes in both cities as well as spending time in numerous bus stands. Dar and Tanga were chosen primarily because their differing legacies of urban planning highlight the factors influencing the contestation of Tanzania's urban roadways.

5.1 Dar es Salaam & Tanga

Both Dar and Tanga grew as ports under successive colonization by the Omani sultans, the Germans, and the British, and consequently, the physical infrastructure [including roadways, railways, and colonial administrative buildings] of both cities was planned to facilitate the efficient export of goods brought from the interior. Both cities maintain this historical legacy of spaces created with then “modern’ concepts of design, relying on capital intensive technology and materials” (King 1990: 41). After independence, however, the cities’ paths diverged with Tanga’s growth stagnating as business increasingly transitioned to Dar, which rapidly grew to be Tanzania’s economic capitol. The statistical difference between the two cities is significant as Figure 1 illustrates.

Figure 1 ²		
	Dar es Salaam	Tanga
Population	2.5 million	179,400
Growth Rate	4.3%	1.8%
Population Density per km ²	2 498	858

The evidence of urban planning in Tanga is largely limited to the pre-existing spaces of the colonial roadways, while in Dar, urban planning is manifest both in colonial spaces and

¹ For the remainder of this paper, “worker” will refer to both driver and conductor interchangeably unless otherwise specified.

² (Tanzania Census 2002, Tanzania in Figures 2004, The Regional and District Census Data in Brief 2004; Land and Climate 2004).

in contemporary regulation since, “urban planning relates, on the one hand to the actual creation of planned space and, on the other, to the regulation and modification of existing areas by means of statutory legislation and municipal controls” (King 1990: 59).

The contestation of space, as described by the daladala workers reflects the disparate fortunes of these two cities, with Dar’s much higher density resulting in greater competition for the right to use the roadways in that city, and consequently heavier regulation. David Mwaibulla, the powerful chairman of the Dar es Salaam Regulatory Authority (DLRA), acts as a powerful voice for a more hegemonic, technocratic function of roadways. He is backed by the aforementioned studies by the supranationals, which focus their redevelopment efforts on Dar because of its status as Tanzania’s primate city and economic capitol. The greater intensity of planning and regulation in Dar leads to different experiences for the workers of the two cities, although the myth of marginality that Dar’s citizens, media, and the DLRA create about daladala workers in their city actually encompasses workers in both cities, since the conceptions are propagated via the media and through migrants’ stories.

5.2 Economic Profile

Like much of sub-Saharan Africa, the economic conditions in Tanzania leave much to be desired, and the quality of life for many urban residents has actually declined since independence due to the combined effects of the socialist Ujumaa (Unity) program – instituted after independence by Julius Nyerere, Tanzania’s first president – and neoliberal structural adjustment programs (SAP) (Abedeji 1999; Nantulya et al. 2001; Hyden & Karlstrom 1993; Silberschmidt 2001). The SAP’s instituted throughout the 1980’s further shocked a Tanzanian economy that had already been severely strained by Ujumaa policies.

Although a surprising equity pervaded under Ujumaa, with the richest earning a wage only 9 times that of the poorest labourer, it was an equity in poverty, as Nyerere’s social engineering and nationalization of industry uprooted millions of people and decimated production (Hyden 1993). This collective poverty ended in the 1980’s as the deregulation,

decentralization, and privatization, which were the hallmark of SAP led to positive GDP growth and dramatic income polarization (Abedeji 1999; van der Hoeven 2000). Aside from growing inequality, the SAP brought several effects that especially ravaged the Tanzanian poor. Significantly, WB imposed austerity measures led to a dramatic currency devaluation between 1986 and 2000 as the shilling dropped from 33 to 1,000 to the dollar (Isinika et al. 2003); and the discontinuation of subsidies on key goods such as petrol, the rising price of which increasingly affects the profits of those who depend on transport for a living.

And “so severe has been the burden of debt on ordinary people... that its destructive impact is comparable to that of war. The only difference is that children and pregnant women are dying, rather than soldiers, and instead of millions wounded, there are millions unemployed” (Abedeji 1999: 526). Stringent cutbacks in spending have led to, for example, cost sharing in education, so that where in 1979 there was 100% enrolment in primary school education, in 2000 there was only 77% enrolment and less than 15% in secondary schools (Nantulya et al. 2001).

Perhaps the most severe effect of SAP's has been the dramatic increase in urban unemployment. While in 1984, 84% of men in Dar had formal employment, fewer than 45% of men currently do (Silberschmidt 2001). Youth aged 15-24 represent 60% of unemployed nationally, with that rate continuing to rise (Nantulya et al. 2001; ILF Survey 2001). Increases in unemployment do not reveal the whole situation, however, as the number of people who are underemployed is increasing and currently estimated to number twice as many as the number of unemployed (ILF News Release 2003). With so little formal employment, people are increasingly turning to the informal sector jobs such as working in bus stands for economic opportunities (Simone 2001).

Examples from Tanzania show that SAPs have exacerbated hardships and are therefore enhancing poverty rather than alleviating it. Their emphasis on reducing government expenditure in unproductive sectors of the economy is leading to negative trends in social development in urban areas, including physical and civic infrastructure. The urban environment is now

decaying progressively rather than improving with deleterious consequences on people's health. The adoption of SAPs seems to be hurting the poor instead of assisting them (Lugalla 1997: 1).

These problems have been exacerbated by two dramatic forces in Tanzania:

HIV/AIDS and corruption. The latter drains away resources that could improve infrastructure, with \$80 million missing in 1995 alone, while the former has decimated families, livelihoods and drained resources from other projects (Briggs & Mwamfupe 2000; Silberschmidt 2001). This portrait of the current economic state has been included to illustrate the desperation that many urban poor experience and emphasize that there is a great scarcity of unemployment and this dearth affects the livelihood strategies of the urban poor.

6. Daladals in Tanzania

The primary means of transport for the urban poor, daladals range in capacity from 16-36 passengers, with the 16 seat Toyota Hiace van being the most common, and charge from 100-200 Tanzanian Shillings (tsh) – the equivalent of about \$0.1-0.2 – for an intra-city trip. Although this amount may not seem high, it effectively deters many of the urban poor from travelling, as a roundtrip would represent up to 22% of the average daily wage in Tanzania (Olvera et al. 2003). The fares, as well as other matters are regulated municipally, with the first legal network being created in Dar after deregulation ended the monopoly of the grossly inefficient state-owned bus company Shirika La Usafiri Dar es Salaam, (UDA) in 1985 (Olvera et al. 2003; Howe & Bryceson 2000; Briggs & Mwamfupe 2000).

Deregulation of transport proved to be an ironically beneficial effect of the SAP as the consequent ease of entry afforded the opportunity for many small entrepreneurs to purchase daladals and created employment opportunities for many who were otherwise unable to find jobs. Daladals now operate in almost all cities, with capacity determined by demand; Dar, for example is estimated to have around 8,500 to service the population, while a city the size of Tanga would have significantly fewer (Olvera et al. 2003). Routes are planned by the city,

and buses for a particular route are painted with a coloured stripe to ensure that they follow the correct route throughout the course of the day.

Daladala workers are not salaried, but receive a commission on the excess amount after the owner collects his required sum each day. This system of compensation leads to many of the reckless behaviours, including speeding, frequent stopping, and competition for passengers, for which daladalas are regularly lambasted. The crews on individual daladalas vary, though there is always at least one driver and a conductor who is responsible for attracting passengers, collecting fares, calling stops, and keeping order inside. In Dar, one van may have several drivers who operate in shifts because the large demand for daladalas demands that the vehicle always be en route, while in smaller cities, the drivers can recuperate while they idle in waiting for passengers to fill up the van. Entry into daladala work occurs through myriad avenues: formal education through the Vocational Educational Training Association (VETA); through acquaintance with owner; or through familial ties, but workers generally begin as conductors, progress to drivers after gaining experience, and aspire to being owners if possible.

After the owners take their daily cut of 30,000-40,000 tsh, an amount that depends on arrangements between individual drivers and owners, the remaining money less the cost of petrol and bribes is divided among those who worked on the van, and the daily take may vary as friends give their place to others who may need the income more urgently. On profitable routes, those with dense ridership, or where few own cars, each worker might earn more than 10,000 tsh a day, while on less used routes, or on bad days, the income may only amount to 1,000 tsh each. To put these amounts in context, in 2003 the government set the monthly minimum wage at 55,000 tsh (Tanzania Facts and Figures 2004). Although daladala workers are included in minimum wage laws, in practice very few owners have been willing or able to pay regular wages, and some workers prefer the commission because they can earn above the minimum wage if they are hard working and lucky with passengers.

Various owner associations exist, although membership is not required and they serve a largely nominal purpose in lobbying the government for better regulation. There is no profile of the average owner, although importantly, it is possible for drivers to become owners if they save up for the purchase of the car, which is really the only requirement for becoming registered as a municipal operator. Most owners run no more than a few vans, with the average in Dar being about 1 car per owner (TRL 2002). Almost all vans are bought second-hand from Asia or the Middle East as well as from other daladala owners who are upgrading their fleets. The cost for a good van from Asia was about \$5,000 throughout the 1990's, which meant that a van should be profitable within one year, although currently the same van would cost upwards of \$10,000 due to rising import costs. Vans deteriorate quickly due to unavailability of parts, the poor quality of roads, and inadequate maintenance, but as long as the van runs, an owner is able to sell it to another because few regulations monitor the quality of the vans in the road. This filtering effect, as well as a rumoured introduction of inexpensive Brazilian vans has important implications for aspirational drivers that will be discussed later (TRL 2002; Owner 1, Dar; Owner 4, Dar).

This brief sketch of the daladala networks situates the workers' use of the roadways in context and the following sections will focus on their experience of space from their own perspectives to elucidate how they constitute the representational space of the roadway.

7. Representations of Space and Representational Spaces in Urban Roadways

Daladala workers occupy marginal space in a number of respects – marginal livelihoods, marginal masculinities, and marginal social position – yet they and their mythology occupy a central role in the Tanzanian public imagination, with the national newspapers not infrequently publishing at least two articles daily about some aspect of the daladala (Connell 1995). The popular perception of them, overwhelmingly negative, blends with economic conditions, cultural norms, and historical factors to influence how daladala

workers constitute their masculinity as well as the spatial *tactics* they use to pursue their livelihoods.

They continually and actively engage with these challenges to “produce a plurality of responses, included within which are the ways in which they use space” (Briggs & Mwamfupe 2000: 799). All of this plays out in roadways built according to hegemonic representations of space, and under the threat that planners and regulators will assert the dominant spatial practice and obviate the *tactics* of the daladala workers (Tiwari 2003). As this threat becomes reality in Dar, with increasing pressure on the daladala workers to conform to acceptable standards, the media extends the hegemonic discourse nationally to affect perceptions of workers in other cities, though not necessarily the working conditions on the roadways, which mostly remain subject to local conditions.

7.1 Constituting Masculinity

To explore the ways in which daladala workers constitute the space of the roadways, it is first necessary to discern the motivations behind their *tactics* and to penetrate their own understanding of their work. Again and again, in conversations, the workers themselves indicate the important place that being a daladala worker has in their sense of masculinity. Their *tactics* constitute a masculine space and role through which they reclaim the masculine roles that patriarchal legacy demands of them, but which have been threatened by high unemployment.

The essential conflict for many men in Tanzanian cities is that even though their historical patriarchy emplaces them as the head of household, the lack of employment or adequate wages makes it impossible to support their families and thus fulfil their masculine roles (Silberschmidt 2001; Silberschmidt 2001a; Stoletzki 2000). With many men being unable to support their families, women share in the role of breadwinner, undermining men’s sense of masculinity; unable to support their families, men are also losing the complete control, which they traditionally have held over their wife and children. This male

responsibility for and right to control has a cultural and historical base, but without money to support their households, men are losing the material base for that authority and must seek out alternative material means to validate their masculine identity (MacPhail 2003; Morrell & Swart 2004).

The predominant school of thought concerning men in Sub-Saharan Africa is that sexual prowess becomes the predominant, real and measurable means of asserting their masculinity (Silberschmidt 2001; Stoletzki 2000; MacPhail 2003; Morrell 2001; Beynon 2002). The pandemic of HIV/AIDS is at least partially attributed to men's increasing promiscuity, which proves their virility, and consequently their masculinity; sexual encounters can be quantified and the more numerous they are, the more that masculinity is substantiated. This strain of reasoning emphasizes that men embrace the subordinated or marginal masculinities of being physical, "idle, lascivious and sexually decadent" because they are not able to achieve the hegemonic masculinity of being an effective head of household (Beynon 2002). This alternative marginal expression of masculinity arrived as part of colonialism when the colonizers positioned their wealth and knowledge as the dominant or hegemonic masculinity as part of their strategy of maintaining dominance over the natives (Morrell & Swart 2004). They attempted to "create an African masculinity that mirrored a flattering vision of the official's own maleness," which included economic power and technical dominance, but subverted masculinities that were based on other attributes (Silberschmidt 2001: 667).

But as MacPhail (2003) notes, masculinity is a complex arena and one understanding will not suffice for all men; not all African men will seek their masculinity in sexual prowess, and one man may pursue various outlets for the expression of his masculinity. Some, as do the daladala workers, alternatively express their masculinity through control over space (Morrell & Swart 2004). The daladala workers constitute both the space of the roadways and the space inside the van as a masculine realm, evoking it as an alternative path to masculinity;

furthermore, as economic activity, daladala work also affords men a path back to what would be the ideal of hegemonic masculinity – that of head of household – were not the role of daladala worker marginalized by public opinion. The tensions among these competing notions of masculinity bears out in discussion with men who express ambivalence about their role as daladala workers.

The phraseology used to discuss mistresses in Tanzania implies that even men who pursue sexual prowess as an affirmation of their masculinity see control of space as an inherent aspect of masculinity. As men lose control of their household by failing to provide for it, they seek households that will make fewer demands of them economically, which are the households of their mistresses. The Kiswahili term for mistress is either ‘nyumba ndogo,’ which translates as ‘small house’ or ‘mchumba,’ which translates as a ‘room.’ By claiming a woman as mistresses, men are also claiming rights over her household and space. Men expect not only sex, but also the role of head of household, with meals prepared for them and space for “nice comfort” (Silberschmidt 2001: 666). If men are looking for spaces where they can exercise the masculine roles to which they are accustomed, the roadways offer another option.

From the way in which daladala workers express an understanding of their work, it is evident that the roadways do represent a substitute space for affirming masculinity, through aggressively controlling them and earning enough money to support their families. By constituting the job as a masculine one, the workers obligate themselves to engage in behaviours that will earn enough money to be a material basis for their claim to masculinity.

By constituting the skills required to work on a daladala as masculine, the roadways can become a place of pride for the workers (Salzinger 2003). “We men think it’s a nice job and are proud of it. Thus when a woman sees you in the car, she finds that you’re a very important person more than anybody else.” To masculinize the job, the men emphasized the physical exertion, concentration, and endurance required, as well as the aggressive control of space both inside the van and on the road that were required to be an effective worker.

According to my views, women can't do these jobs since I have difficulties even in trying to close or open the door.

[Women do not do this work] because women are lazy. They have too many thoughts when in the road, thinking about a fight between her and her husband and feeling lonely. When I'm on the road, I only think about driving, but a woman can't.

The car goes to Ubungo or Manzese or Kariakoo, 20 cars in the line, 10 cars with passengers and the rest empty completely. You now want passengers. If the conductor is not quick [to attract passengers], you can be moving with an empty car.

According to me, she gets trouble... She can quarrel with the passengers but if it were a man there could be some sort of fight. Now a woman can't do this.

Because we men drivers are not cowards [we can do this work]. Also we don't have mercy. But our fellow sisters normally have mercy and are cowards.

“These comments assert the essential masculinity of the work through explicit distinctions between their relationship to the work,” and women’s capabilities (Salzinger 2003: 144). Only men are capable of controlling passengers, driving aggressively to beat cars to the next stop, and attracting passengers with their playful calling, for which they adopt an affected monotonic drawl to repeatedly shout their destination. When asked about women in a group setting, the men often fell into a jocular recitation of women’s foibles. In describing their work in these terms, the daladala workers, “redefine the work, as well as the social space of production, as masculine” (Ibid: 151).

Although most men insist that women are incapable of the work, when confronted with the reality that the few women who attempt the job are able, the men adopt the strategy of masculinizing the women or marking their behaviour as the product of some sort of deviance. Women who work the daladalas are either more like men than women or must smoke marijuana. In a culture where gender roles are rigidly

defined and where drug use is a highly illicit and reprehensible activity, attributing either behaviour to a woman is a severe aspersion.

Other women get surprised and think maybe this girl smokes marijuana... or how else is she able to do this job [as daladala worker]?

For women here to become a conductor is very difficult. They're few and when you see a woman doing this activity in the car, she has male hormones. Her hormones are like that of a man.

For me, I see that most of the women here prefer to deal with prostitution rather than becoming drivers and conductors. When you find a woman here in Dar, you should know that her family is poor. She has found that she is unable to do prostitution, that's why she decides to be a conductor. When you see them, you will find that they have the hormones like those of men. Even when you give them a female job, they can't do it.

Each of these quotes was drawn from separate interview sessions and is not indicative of parroting of ideas, and significantly, the discourse about masculinity in daladala work seems to be constitutive not only of the behaviour of men in the business but also of that of the few women who do work as conductors or drivers (Salzinger 2003). One woman conductor interviewed in Tanga adopted not only the baggy pants, t-shirt and hat pulled down low over her face that men often wore, but also the distinct call and detached and assertive mien which conductors often project to formalize their role as money collector. She admits, "most women don't do this job because they're based on prostitution more. They are selling their body. Therefore for a person to do this sort of job, she finds herself ashamed."

The equating of daladala work with prostitution, a decidedly marginal occupation in Tanzania, is an acknowledgment of the conflict that the work presents between fulfilling the patriarchal role of head of household and filling an occupation which the public widely regards as "inherently immoral and infested with crime," a job for the uneducated or lazy (Hansen 2003). As one driver laments, "most people think we're gangsters."

This tension leaves many workers longing for the acceptability and stability of a monthly wage, rather than the current entrepreneurial system, because it would give them a

means to plan for the future and prevent much of the behaviour for which the men are condemned. “When you employ somebody and pay him he can’t bring violence in the road competing for passengers or to drive fast and drive in somebody’s path.” The workers prefer contract salaries, since they would “make a lot of money for a month or a year,” but the current economics of the daladala industry preclude the good wages that they prefer, because it would require raising the rates which would put the fare out of reach for much of the urban poor who depend on daladalas for transport (Kironde 1991). The high wages for which the workers long are economically unfeasible in the daladala world and unavailable in other fields, because there simply is no waged employment to be found elsewhere.

I want to be employed in order that I can improve my life, but there’s no employment.

If there could be the possibility of getting another job, I could be ready to leave this job.

In case we had sufficient companies, we’d get employment opportunities in those companies. The main problem is unemployment.

With no choice, they continue because the work is a rare outlet that facilitates their fulfilling the role of head of household, even though through it they “are socialized into a masculinity with the aura of violent and aggressive behaviour... [and] such behaviour has been reinforced by poverty, lack of access to education and employment” (Silberschmidt 2001a: 6). The behaviour which they describe as masculine and which causes them to be seen as “a great hazard to commuters” and unreliable, is necessary because it allows them “to feed the kids that they should not die with hunger,” or so that “I will not die of hunger, and people will laugh at me.” The strategies that the workers use to effect these dual expressions of masculinity result in many of the behaviours that make the streets seem chaotic in terms of our discourses of ordered roadways.

7.2 Contesting the Roadways

Both the method of remuneration and the tendency of the workers to play up the masculine, aggressive nature of the job influence their driving. The busier roadways bespeak an almost manic appropriation – where multiple daladals jockey for space in overcrowded roadways, shouting their routes, urging customers to ride with them, overtaking their competition only to suddenly stop at the sign from a pedestrian that he requires a lift and dodging other cars, the hawkers, bicyclists, and donkey carts, all the while blaring their customized horns and “bongo flava” hip hop at maximum volume - that belies the efficient flow of vehicular traffic sought for in urban roadways by planners. But the chaos resolves into rationality when motives are examined.

Working on commission encourages moving the highest volume of passengers possible, which, in turn, leads to “speeding, overtaking, poor parking and frequent vehicle stoppages to pick up or drop passengers on their way to anticipated destinations” (Howe & Bryceson 2000: 48). These charges are true and do lead to dangerous road conditions, but are attributable not to recklessness or a pandemic “of low level of education among... drivers,” as Mwaibulla contends, but to calculated *tactics* to make the work profitable (Kivamwo 2005). The shouting and loud music distinguish one van from another and lure passengers; “when you put a tape in your car you can see people attracted by such nice music; now everybody would want to enter your car.” Although passengers frequently complain about long waits as a sign of the ‘backwardness’ of the system, the high cost of petrol combined with the low fares, which are fixed by the government, mean that it is only economical for the daladals to begin their journeys once they have lured enough passengers; and passengers steadfastly refuse or are unable to pay higher fares. While the consumers and other users of the roadways mark all of these strategies as undesirable, in order to fulfil their role as head of household and *be* masculine, the men must adopt all of these strategies.

Another common complaint made by planners and aid agencies is that the poor state of repair of aging vehicles makes operation unsafe and results in delays as break-downs are frequent (TRL 2002). Again, this is a complicated problem; were ageing cars to be retired or a certain minimum standard required, fewer entrepreneurs would be able to purchase cars and rates would increase beyond the capability of the poor to pay (Kironde 1991). Only the very wealthy would be able to maintain vans to ‘Northern’ standards, and the purchase of less expensive, beat-up vans is one way that drivers and conductors realize their dreams of becoming owners.

The daladala community, besides constituting itself as masculine, maintains a hierarchy of roles, which are tied to age, and through which they aspire to climb until they do become owners. Young men begin as conductors, but must progress to driving lest they be humiliated for remaining too long on the lowest rung. The ultimate goal is to save enough money to become an owner, whereupon the men achieve the desired state of security which affords them status and the ability to “plan for the future.” Ultimately, their appropriation of space strives towards the financial security, and hence the security of their role as head of household, that they perceive ownership to confer.

When you are old enough, this job isn't conducive, so you need one day to find a car to drive and take your young brother to do this job [as conductor].

But we can't manage to [plan for the future] because our employment is temporary. I can't do this because I'm incapable of seeing in front; I'm in the dark, you see? But if I can find a car, now I can plan for the future. It's like now I'm in the river between; I can't cross it and have lost hope to go back and hence I'm just in the middle of the river swimming.

In the future, I'm planning to become a driver. After I become a driver, then is the time when I will start constructing a house, buying furniture, and if God helps me, to own a van.

Daladala workers in both cities manifest these risky behaviours and both are subject to the extensive myth that most of the problems on the road, as well as the violence in the bus

stands is due to their inherent immorality and the fact that they are possessed of “some sort of selfishness and... [enjoy] fooling the passengers, that is their own psychological weakness” (Eneza 2005). The regulatory officials, the media, and the road-sharing public all associate daladalas with broader ideas about danger and risk to construct a narrative about their deviance, because the roadways there are more heavily used and contested (Hubbard & Sanders 2003). The significant difference lies, however, in that workers in Dar are penalized for their behaviour to a greater extent. Whereas drivers in Dar operate under constant threat from two police forces and competing users on the roadway, most workers in Tanga cite the predilection of too many men for saving the price of the fare by riding their bicycles instead as their biggest problem.

The most forceful advocate for a hegemonic spatial practice in Dar is David Mwaibulla, the head of the (DLRA), whom the daladala workers universally cite as antagonistic, and who has been described by the usually friendly *Guardian* as being bitter toward daladala workers (Kivamwo 2005). His DLRA seeks to “impose an order, and to constitute the elements of that order... The working class [urban poor], in particular suffers the effects of such ‘reduced models’, including models of space, of consumption and of so-called culture,” (Lefebvre 1991: 107) and this “determinate and hence demarcated space necessarily embraces some things and excludes others” (Ibid: 99). Creating an “accurate car controlling movement” to end the problem as the DRLA aspires necessarily precludes the masculine *tactics* of the daladala workers – as well as those of many other user groups such as roadside vendors, donkey carts, and pedestrians – and naively relies on a purely technical solution to a complicated problem (Kivamwo 2005).

Recently the DLRA sought to curb disruptive behaviour in the bus stands by hiring private security companies to monitor them, but “sidelined [the daladala workers] when it decided to institute changes in the way public transport is manned in the city” (Tarimo &

Niyungeko 2005). Violent protests ensued as the daladala workers felt disenfranchised and thought their way of life threatened (*The Guardian* 2005a: 2005b: 2005c: Niyibitanga 2005).

While this example of control is a discrete example, the DLRA also maintains a constant presence through its transport police, which ostensibly increases oversight above that which is provided by the city police, but effectively increases the regulatory penetration of the daladala workers' lives and also has the Foucauldian 'instrument effect' of increasing their exposure to corruption (Ferguson 1994). The transport police control the minutiae of the daladala workers' experience, including the drivers' footwear, by prohibiting open-toed shoes because they might lead to increased accidents.

They also fine them for infractions above what the normal police have already fined them, and generally are very corrupt (Johanson 2005). The workers consistently believe that everything that the transport police "do is because they want bribes." They describe common tricks the police use, such as refusing to give written citation for a problem with the van because they know that the owner will refuse to fix it without written orders, so the police will be able to fine the van for the same problem the next day. Unintentionally, the policemen's corruption is exacerbating the behaviours that they are supposed to end, because the workers have to intensify their *tactics* to make up for the money they lose to bribery.

Together with the DLRA, the media and the public build a dominant narrative to assert the deviance of the daladala workers, who "lack everything from education to employment, and therefore [are] potential criminals" (*The Guardian* 2005b). Headlines in newspapers trumpet, "Bus Accident Kills Seven" and "Three Run Over at Dar Bus Stop," even though in neither case was a daladala at fault (Saro 2005; Lyimo 2005). The latter article led with the statement, "Three people, including two children, were killed yesterday when they were run over by a *daladala*," and doesn't acknowledge until the 4th paragraph that the daladala was parked in a bus stand when a speeding lorry pushed it into the victims (Lyimo

2005, original emphasis). In these two cases, which are only two of many that are frequently published, the proximity of daladala workers is enough to implicate them in blame.

These attacks on the *tactics* through which daladala workers create their representational space emphasize that consumption supersedes concerns with production in urban transportation. These various agents' dissatisfaction with the model of transport being offered for consumption – that which affords the daladala drivers the chance to reclaim their role as head of household – reflects the technocratic agenda of aid agencies, whose plans for the Tanzanian roadways attempt to remake space in the image of their own hegemonic representations of space, with insufficient regard to the workers reproduction of labour.

Mwaibulla, the media and the public use narrative and appeal to discourse in order to assail those *tactics*, which do not comply with their representations of space, which largely conform to the planner's ideal, but they have little power to effect *strategies* in reshaping the space to achieve their ends of enhancing the consumption of transportation. The public and the media marginalize the daladala workers with their narratives, while Mwaibulla controls their behaviour through his heavy regulation and corrupt police force. Occasionally the two groups act in concert, when, for example, a passenger who is tired of waiting, threatens to report an imaginary transgression to the police, knowing that the worker would rather begin driving than be forced to pay a bribe. The unease that daladala workers feel about their precarious situation is reflected in the persistence of unfounded rumours that a Brazilian company, which is going to begin selling daladalas to compete with the Japanese Hiace, is also going to bring its own conductors to run the Tanzanian daladala workers out of business.

8. Discussion

Although the daladala workers' *tactics* have not been precluded by either marginalizing narrative or regulation as of yet, were Mwaibulla to increase enforcement, he could prevent their creation of a representational space; the relationship among

representational space, spatial practice, and representations of space depends on the socio-political, legal, and economic climate, and changes in any of the factors could dramatically change how daladala workers constitute their space (Hubbard & Sanders 2003). Very strict enforcement could prohibit their *tactics*, while substantial economic growth could moot the daladalas' services, as people migrate toward car ownership or 'Northern' style bus systems. Recognizing these potential reconfigurations of the trialectic adds temporality to Lefebvre's production of space and intimates just how delicately balanced and complex spatial outcomes actually are and emphasizes the possibility for change. The modernization programs espoused by international aid agencies as well as their *strategies* of actually producing new space threaten to upset the current balance and erode the coherence of the daladala workers' representational space.

As the colonialists used *strategies* to create space to serve the needs of their empires, the funding of the WB and other aid agencies facilitates *strategies* to rebuild the road networks so that traffic moves faster and at higher volume. These *strategies*, however, isolate the space for a minority of users who utilize the roads primarily for consumption, and dominate the representational spaces of the daladalas, whose *tactics* require creating friction in the roadways, as well as of the multitudes who also use the roadways as their realm of production, who will be endangered when they drive their pushcarts, attempt to sell their wares, or ride their bicycles on roadways with high-speed traffic (TRL 2002). In expanding efficient roads without accounting for the social effects on the urban poor, the planners are creating spaces "without taking into account their interrelationships and their relationship to the whole" (Tiwari 2003; Lefebvre 1991: 124).

A typical study by the WB recommends that replacing the roughly 8,500 small, poorly maintained daladalas with only 2,000 "standard buses" of the type used in 'modern' transportation systems would increase the capacity of the system, reduce congestion, and result in higher average traffic speeds (TLR 2002: p. 129). Not only would such a program

entail roughly 11,000 lost jobs, but also the buses would be too expensive for the small entrepreneurs to purchase, further denying the dream of many workers to become owners, which is a core objective of their *tactics*, and which is already challenged by the rising cost of importing cars due to inflation, and the lower rates of saving they are able to achieve due to rising fuel costs. The introduction of the cheaper Brazilian vans, which might increase the possibility of ownership, may prove an only temporary reprieve, however.

With little voice to object to either additional regulation and enforcement by Mwaibulla or the modernization programs of aid agencies, that in the case of roadways overwhelmingly entail enhancing consumption, the daladala workers, as is exemplified by the strikes and violence that arose from the plan to impose private security at the bus stands, develop an “intense attachment to place and ‘turf’ and an exact sense of boundaries because it is only through active appropriation that control over space is assured” (Harvey 1987: 270). They rely on their *tactics* to “undermine the strategies of the strong by misusing spaces, escaping their constraints without necessarily disturbing their boundaries” (Hubbard & Sanders: 83).

Daladalas will likely persist in some form, however, for the simple reason that despite the general unease with the way in which the daladala workers achieve their own daily reproduction, the cities rely on them to afford the general reproduction of the workforce: commuting would be immeasurably more difficult without their services, and virtually impossible over intermediate distances for the urban poor (Cooper 1983). The representational space of the roadways, however, is dependent on how the daladala workers constitute their masculinities, and this analysis relies on the ideas of the admittedly under researched body of work on masculinity in the third world (Morrell 2004). It is very possible that notions of masculinity and means of constituting it will change through time, altering the nature of what it means to be a daladala worker. Even the notion that men express their masculinity through sexual prowess has needed updating because knowledge about

HIV/AIDS is causing some men to change their sexual behaviour (Pool et al. 1996). Changes to daladala work can come not only from external forces, but also from new ways that the men understand themselves, their masculinity and their work.

Additionally, while empirical evidence supports these assertions for Tanzania, minibus systems of this sort exist throughout Africa and Asia and a latitudinal comparison would prove germane and provide a more catholic perspective on the pertinent issues (Robinson 2002).

9. Conclusions

The dysfunction of cities in developing countries is often taken for granted and as a justification for international aid agencies to impose Northern discourses of modern technology and neoliberal policies as a strategy of 'fixing' problems. Closer and more cosmopolitan examination of these cities, however, reveals that their seeming chaos is partly a product of our attempts to read them using a language with which they do not necessarily cohere. If we could discover the discourse according to which space is dominantly used, the cities would gain a measure of legibility for us.

Lefebvre's trialectic of space provides a useful way to treat with these contradictions. In 'Northern' cities, which were built by and where people live according to the discourses of urban planning and neoliberalism that have their genesis in 'Northern' cities, the space is generally very clearly understood. In cities where the dominant uses of space do not correlate with the discourse, which we understand, however, we find that the language, which we are accustomed to utilize in making sense of cities fails us. To read cities where this occurs, we must seek to understand the dominant practice and the discourses that explain and guide it. In Lefebvrian terms, when representational space dominates spatial practice, representations of space fail to elucidate the dominant patterns of the city, and instead we must understand those forces, which motivate and constitute representational space.

The situation is not so simple as to say that cities in the developing world operate on a completely distinct conceptualization of space, however, since frequently the space in their cities was produced according to the representations of space that were in the past dictated by the colonialists and contemporarily proffered by the experts at international aid agencies as well as local experts trained in the ways of 'Northern' planning. We are confronted with the case where the *tactics* of the citizens constitute the representational space, spatial practice is adhered to by relatively few and the hegemonic discourse of planning challenges the representational spaces on behalf of the few.

The daladala workers in Tanzania, through constituting their masculinity, present an exemplar of those who appropriate the dominated space of the roadways and through their various *tactics* create a representational space that dominates the accepted spatial practice as enforced by the urban planners in the DLRA. Through understanding why and how the daladala workers use their profession as an alternative means of constituting their masculinity, the roadways of Tanzania become legible and sensible spaces in the city and shed their mystery as the chaotic confluence of teeming humanity for which they might initially be mistaken.

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APPENDIX 1: METHODOLOGY

In seeking to penetrate the representational space of the Tanzanian roadways, I identified examining the experiences of the daladala workers as one of the most important ways through which I could understand the space. While certain factors of the daladala business had already been reported in World Bank documents and other academic work, and general context gleaned from newspaper accounts, few secondary sources deal with the perceptions and daily experiences of the daladala workers themselves, so I determined that interviewing them would be the only way to obtain the information I needed. As I approached the research via a roughly ethnographic approach, several methodological issues arose throughout that bear mentioning because they either shaped the process or possibly the nature of the evidence, although I attempted to control for validity and reliability.

In order to conduct the interviews, I relied on a translator and research assistant, Mamertus Kifaru, a Tanzanian friend of mine and a form 6 leaver, who, under my direction, and after instruction by me on the object of the research, conducted most of the tape recorded interviews and later transcribed and translated them. By adding another link in the chain of data interpretation, I realize that I have introduced more subjectivity into the process, but aside from the language issue, I wanted to include Mamertus in the process because as interviewer he could achieve an ease with and confidence from the interviewees that I as a white Westerner could not (Mullings 1999).

This suspicion bore out as through initial interviews, which we conducted with one respondent at a time, my prominent role left the respondent more reticent. To lessen this effect, we conducted subsequent interviews in groups of three to four, interviewing drivers and conductors separately so that the respective peer groups could speak freely (Kitchin & Tate 2000). In this way, the interview became a semi-structured conversation, guided by Mamertus who steered the process with questions that we had agreed upon earlier, but the order of which we left dependent on the flow of the conversation (Hall & Hall 1996).

I thought it especially important to make the conversations as informal as possible, because from my experience, Tanzanians view formal communication as an exercise with a definite goal. Letters, for example, are usually written to make a request to the recipient rather than for mere exposition. Beliefs and rumours about my being either a journalist, World Bank employee, or government consultant, persisted in several cases despite my insistent denials and served to position me as a potential recipient of grievances. Consequently both my presence as well as the formal nature of the interview itself tended to make the responses more targeted than they might have been otherwise.

To lessen this effect, I tried not to take a very active part in the group discussions, and checked the transcripts carefully to make sure that ideas that I included in my research were validly backed up by other contextual statements as well as by the responses of other workers (Hall & Hall 1996). Commonly, for example, when asked about their relationship with the van owners, the workers declared that it was terrible and needed redress. Yet they would later admit to a good relationship with the owner when he was discussed in responses other than those originating from the targeted question. Mamertus, as a young man like most of those we interviewed, was better able “to empathize with them and to gain an understanding of their lives through a genuine trusting relationship,” and so elicit honest responses (Kitchin & Tate: 224). To facilitate as much ease among the respondents as possible and to decrease formality, we held the discussions in teahouses nearby to their place of work during times when they were on breaks. I didn’t offer monetary compensation, although I did provide a tea or soda for each respondent.

The group format also proved useful because the varied responses led to lively conversation where the variation in respondents’ answers precipitated new ideas and debate (Holstein & Gubrium 1995). The usage of the tape recorder didn’t affect the respondents’ willingness to participate, and they eagerly utilized it to make sure their responses were clearly recorded. I thought that the group sessions and distancing myself would also reduce

the chance of the “acquiescence effect,” whereby a single respondent answers questions as he feels the interviewer would prefer, because the outcome would be more like a natural conversation than a formal interview.

Although each of these methodological issues is rooted in the relationship I, as researcher, have with the respondents, as well as the relationship which the respondents have with the interview process itself, one potential source of error lies entirely in the chance that I will fail to “faithfully reproduce the literal dialogue between researcher and researched, so much as textualize it, and thereby reduce a relatively balanced multisubjective encounter to a monologue in which only the ethnographer has the power to decide what and how many voices are represented in the finished text” (Demeritt & Dyer 2002: 231). Although this distortion may be present to a minor extent, I have sought to rigorously ensure the validity of the interviews by not including any data from one respondent that was not corroborated by another without prompting from leading questions. I have also sought to ensure that the statements were plausible according to what I was able to learn about the daladala networks from government literature, newspaper accounts, and academic reports. I have included only those statements, which adhere generally to the consensus opinion about the network.

When I was not able to empirically support ideas, I sought out comparable notions from disparate groups to see if the idea were generally known or parochial. This case occurred, for instance, when I first heard from a daladala worker that women in Tanzanian cities share a predilection for prostitution. I found this implausible and more likely to be the result of a male bias, so I tried to seek out the three or four women workers about whom I knew in Dar and Tanga to understand their opinions. Although I was only able to locate one in Tanga, when I asked her why women did not work in daladalas, she answered without any leading from me that prostitution was more often the choice. Her response, coupled with that of the worker in Dar who initially voiced the opinion, provides sufficient corroboration of the viewpoint’s generality for me. I have attempted – notwithstanding potential acquiescence bias

or motivated answers – to faithfully represent those ideas, which seem to prevail among the workers.

Due to the time constraints of the research as well as the notion that “the researcher observes only as many activities, or interviews as many people, as are needed in order to ‘saturate’ the categories being developed, and then turns to the next theoretical issue and carries out the same process over again,” I only conducted 30 formal interviews (Bryman 1998a, p.117 in Hall & Hall 1996: 169). As these interviews, hours of observation and many informal conversations converged on certain themes, I was satisfied that I met the condition of ‘saturation’ and could stop without prejudicing my evidence.

The only area of my research in which I was rebuffed, and for which I had to ultimately rely on newspaper accounts was the regulatory voice, as my attempts proved futile in the face of Tanzanian bureaucracy. Despite numerous attempts and cancelled appointments over three days, Mwaibulla’s assistants ultimately refused my third written letter of application despite its meeting their updated expectations because I lacked written authorization from the UK government. As I had neither the time nor power to obtain this, and because I was threatened with arrest if I continued my work in Dar, I decided to let Mwaibulla’s quotes in the press speak for themselves, and continue on to Tanga.